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GATT-Legal Application of Safeguards in
the Context of Regional Trade
Arrangements and its Implications
for the Canada-United States
Free Trade Agreement
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),'
the most important multilateral treaty governing international
trade,2 permits regional trade arrangements such as the new
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement ("FTA").3 Since
World War II, many GATT contracting parties have concluded
regional trade agreements, with the result that much of the
world now conducts its trade under such agreements. 4
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
GATT]. The official text of the agreement, last amended in 1965, is found in
THE TEXT OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, U.N. Sales
No. GATT/1986-4 (1986), and in 4 CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Doc-
UMENTS (1969) [hereinafter GATT, BISD].
2. See Koh, The Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on
the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT'L L.
193, 195 n.6 (1987); see also Ustor, The MFN Customs Union Exception, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 377, 379 (1981) (noting that GATT contracting parties and
their trading partners transact at least 80 percent of world trade according to
the rules of GATT).
3. Free-Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987 - Jan. 2, 1988, Canada-United
States, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter Canada-U.S. FTA].
The United States and Canada had a natural incentive for negotiating a
free trade agreement-each has been the other's largest trading partner. See
Wolff, The Case for a U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement, 10 CANADA-U.S.
L.J.. 225, 227 (1985) (providing statistics). Both governments have believed
that expanded access to each other's markets is mutually beneficial, improving
and solidifying their economic relationship. See id. at 229.
4. The preamble to the GATT states that the governments of the con-
tracting parties agreed to the GATT provisions:
[r]ecognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of liv-
ing, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing vol-
ume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of
the resources of the world and expanding the production and ex-
change of goods, and [b]eing desirous of contributing to these objec-
tives by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and
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One aspect of the Canada-United States agreement is of
questionable legality under the GATT. Although the two coun-
tries have agreed to tear down most trade barriers between
them,5 they have retained the right to resurrect trade barriers
against each other's imports when imports cause "serious in-
jury" to domestic industries.6 The GATT provisions that gov-
ern arrangements such as the Canada-United States FTA do
not expressly permit countries to reimpose such "emergency"
trade barriers, called "safeguards," against each other once the
agreement is in force.7
How Canada and the United States handle the right they
have reserved in their agreement could affect significantly the
way other nations perceive the fairness of the Canada-United
States agreement. The United States has demonstrated a grow-
ing interest in pursuing free trade agreements with other major
other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treat-
ment in international commerce ....
GATT, supra note 1, preamble (emphasis added).
5. The United States and Canada will eliminate almost all mutual trade
barriers within 10 years. See generally Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 3. The
treaty aims to eliminate "barriers to trade in goods and services between the
territories of the Parties." Id. art. 102, para. a.
The FTA progressively eliminates customs duties, id. ch. 4, agricultural
subsidies, id. ch. 7, restrictions on the export and import of energy products,
id. ch. 9, and tariffs, id. ch. 4, and import restrictions for trade in automotive
goods, id. ch. 10. The FTA also confers on both countries "national treatment"
for investment and trade in services. Id, chs. 14-17.
6. Article 1102 of the FTA, entitled "Global Actions," provides:
With respect to an emergency action taken by a Party on a global ba-
sis, the Parties shall retain their respective rights and obligations
under Article XIX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
subject to the requirement that a Party taking such action shall ex-
clude the other Party from such global action unless imports from
that Party are substantial and are contributing importantly to the se-
rious injury or threat thereof caused by imports. For purposes of this
paragraph, imports in the range of five percent to ten percent or less
of total imports would normally not be considered substantial.
Id art. 1102, para. 1. Paragraph 2 provides:
A Party taking an emergency global action, from which the other
Party is initially excluded pursuant to paragraph 1, shall have the
right subsequently to include the other Party in the global action in
the event of a surge in imports of such goods from the other Party
that undermines the effectiveness of such action.
Id. art. 1102, para. 2.
7. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV (governing customs unions and
free-trade areas), infra text accompanying note 41 (quoting GATT art. XXIV,
para. 8). Article XIX, governing "Emergency Action on Imports of Particular
Products," is not listed among the article XXIV exceptions. See id art. XXIV,
para. 8.
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trade partners.8 The United States's ability to persuade other
trade partners to consider such agreements might turn on
United States actions in its agreement with Canada. Further-
more, if other nations believe that the Canada-United States
agreement violates the GATT, those nations may question the
fairness of the whole GATT regime at a time when nations in-
creasingly are resisting the GATT requirements for freer trade.
This Note considers whether the GATT should permit
countries entering into agreements such as the Canada-United
States FTA to impose emergency trade barriers against each
other. Part I describes the GATT free trade agreement provi-
sions and the GATT provisions that allow the use of safeguard
trade barriers outside the free trade agreement context. Part II
examines whether emergency trade barriers constitute a legiti-
mate exception to GATT requirements that countries seeking
the advantages of free trade agreements remove all trade barri-
ers between each other. Part III examines the language and
policies of the GATT provisions to determine how the GATT
should regulate the exception, if it is valid. The Note concludes
that the GATT both permits and requires emergency trade bar-
riers against trade agreement partners whenever countries par-
ticipating in free trade agreements invoke safeguards against
third countries.
8. At the request of the United States Senate, the United States Interna-
tional Trade Commission currently is studying possible FTAs with Japan, Tai-
wan, South Korea, and Pacific Rim nations. See ITC Members, on Tokyo Visit,
Pessimistic About Potential Benefits of U.S.-Japan FTA, [5 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1220, 1220-21 (Aug. 31, 1988). A study published by a
Canadian institute recommends that the Canadian and United States govern-
ments consider a Pacific free trade agreement with Australia, New Zealand,
and Japan. See Five Country Pacific Free Trade Zone Alternative to GATT
Round, Study Saxs, [5 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1571, 1571
(Nov. 30, 1988).
The United States previously concluded a full, bilateral free trade agree-
ment with Israel. See Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, Israel-
United States, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985) [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA];
see also Recent Development, Recent United States Trade Arrangements: Im-
plications of the Most-Favored-Nation Principle and United States Trade Pol-
icy, 17 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 209, 209 & n.2 (1985) (discussing United
States-Israel free trade area).
One reason the United States sought a free trade agreement with Canada
was the "precedent such an agreement.., might have for the development of
multilateral or bilateral free trade arrangements with other nations as well."
Wolff, supra note 3, at 229. The United States, for instance, might apply the
FTA rules governing trade in services in future multilateral negotiations. Id.
As of 1986, the GATT did not regulate trade in services in any significant way.
See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 994 (2d
ed. 1986).
1490 [Vol. 73:1488
I. SAFEGUARDS AND REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN
THE GATT CONTEXT
A. THE GATT AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE
The United States and Canada are both signatories to the
GATT, a multilateral agreement governing trade relations
among signatory countries. 9 The term GATT describes both the
legal agreement in the form of a multilateral treaty and an in-
ternational organization of ninety-six signatory nations.1 0 The
GATT treaty became the primary law of modern international
trade as the result of post-World War II efforts to regulate in-
ternational trade practices and to prevent the recurrence of the
trade protectionism that was rampant before the war.'1 The
negotiators originally intended to create a multinational repre-
sentative body, the International Trade Organization, to regu-
late international trade.1 2  In addition, the negotiators
simultaneously drafted GATT to embody the results of tariff
negotiations and general protective clauses to prevent nations
from evading tariff commitments.' 3 When the United States
Congress failed to ratify the International Trade Organization,
the negotiating countries reverted to the GATT as an existing
legal framework.14 Consequently, the GATT became the major
9. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXXII (defining parties to the agreement).
10. See Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures: The Lessons of
the DISC Case, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1443-44, n.2 (1988). The GATT organization
maintains a secretariat in Geneva with several hundred employees. It main-
tains various committees and other working bodies, a standing agenda of daily
meetings, and a mechanism for adjudicating legal disputes among members.
Id. at 1444 n.2.
11. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 294-95. Recognizing that
the extensive use of tariffs and quotas created havoc prior to World War II,
the negotiating countries sought to establish a regime to promote trade and
stability by international agreement on economic regulation. See J. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT § 1.3, at 9 (1969).
12. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 293-94.
13. See id, at 294-95 (noting also that negotiating nations drafted GATT,
the ITO charter, and tariff concessions at Geneva Conference of 1947). •
14. See R. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 379 (1956). The draft-
ers intended the GATT to be a subsidiary agreement under the ITO charter,
with GATT dependent for enforcement on the ITO. See J. JACKSON & W. DA-
VEY, supra note 8, at 295. The United States negotiated the GATT under the
authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act extension of 1945. See id.;
Act of July 5, 1945, ch. 269, § 1, 59 Stat. 410. The United States, desiring to
complete an ITO draft before its time-limited authority to make tariff agree-
ments expired, signed, with the 21 other original members of GATT, a "Proto-
col of Provisional Application" in 1946 that made the GATT effective in 1948.
See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 295. Despite the ITO Charter's
completion at the Havana conference in 1948, the United States Congress
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vehicle for international trade regulation by default.15
An essential part of the GATT agreement is the most-fa-
vored nation ("MFN") principle, found in Article 1.16 The MFN
principle, also known as nondiscrimination, requires that any
GATT contracting party giving any trade advantage to any
country also must give the same advantage to all other GATT
contracting parties.17 Conversely, MFN implies that a con-
tracting party imposing any disadvantage or trade restriction on
one contracting party must restrict trade with other countries
in the same manner.'8 In essence, the MFN principle dictates
that a country treat every GATT trading partner as well as it
treats its most favored trading partner. MFN promotes the
GATT's purpose of freer international trade by requiring that
the benefit of removing or decreasing a trade barrier for one
country be spread to all the GATT contracting parties. In some
circumstances, however, the GATT provides exceptions to the
MFN requirement.
B. ARTICLE XXIV's RULES FOR REGIONAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS
Article XXIV is a major exception to the MFN principle
that governs the creation and operation of regional trade ar-
rangements.' 9 In regional trade arrangements, the signing
countries agree to eliminate substantially all trade barriers
among themselves to obtain the economic benefits of freer
failed to accept the charter. See id. Without United States partcipation, the
ITO never came into being. See id.
15. See J. JACKSON & W. DAvEY, supra note 8, at 295-96. When the con-
tracting parties amended the GATT to better adapt it to its new role, the
United States accepted the amendments under the authority of the trade
agreements acts. See id.
16. GATT, supra note 1, art. I, para. 1. The article provides that:
[W]ith respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on
or in connection with importation or exportation ... [,J any advantage,
favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be ac-
corded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originat-
ing or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
17. See Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law
of GATT. Toward Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trading Sys-
teM, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 291, 296-97 (1988).
18. See id. at 297 (stating that MFN requires countries to "apply tariffs
and other similar regulatory measures unconditionally and automatically on a
non-discriminatory basis").
19.. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV.
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trade.20 Article XXIV, however, allows states to remove trade
barriers against countries that are members of the regional
trade agreement without eliminating trade barriers against
nonmember countries.21
Article XXIV authorizes two kinds of regional trade ar-
rangements: customs unions and free trade areas.22 A customs
union is an economic union of two or more sovereign territo-
ries.23 Each country in the union retains its own independence
and sovereignty except for customs matters.24 The countries in-
volved in a customs union remove internal trade restrictions
among themselves and become a single customs territory, ap-
plying common external tariffs and common trade regulations
20. See H. HAWKINS, COMMERCIAL TREATIES & AGREEMENTS: PRINCIPLES
& PRACTICE 117 (1951). Removal of trade barriers allows nations better to
share the benefits of mass production, efficient division of labor, and other re-
sources. These advantages place nations that have eliminated trade barriers
through a regional trade arrangement in a strong bargaining position when ne-
gotiating trade agreements with other countries. Id. at 118. Professor Haw-
kins argues that these benefits combine to improve the standard of living in
nations belonging to the regional trade arrangement. Id. Further, Professor
Hawkins asserts that the increased prosperity of the countries belonging to
free trade arrangements fosters international trade and thus benefits the rest
of the world. Id.
Customs unions are rare, despite their benefits, because their formation
requires a level of economic union that is difficult for two or more countries to
achieve. See id. at 119 (explaining that nations contemplating forming cus-
toms union must reconcile economic policy in such areas as "wages, prices,
money, taxes, international trade, tariffs, employment," and labor laws). Na-
tions belonging to customs unions necessarily surrender a degree of national
sovereignty. Countries participating in customs unions must share customs
revenues among themselves, reconcile diverse political ideologies, and abandon
intense notions of nationalism and freedom of action. 1d. Thus, customs un-
ions "are never purely commercial." Haight, Customs Unions and Free-Trade
Areas Under GATT. A Reappraisal, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 391, 392-93 (1972).
Despite these barriers, customs unions can lead to a common market, free
movement of capital and labor, a common currency, and ultimately, a political
union harmonizing fiscal and social policy among participating countries. Id.
21. See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, § 24.1, at 576 (observing that "[t]he
very nature of [a regional arrangement] involves a departure from the Most-
Favored-Nation principle"). The negotiating countries excepted regional ar-
rangements from MFN obligations because they believed that such arrange-
ments liberalize trade and therefore do not conflict with the purpose of the
GATT. See Recent Development, supra note 8, at 224-25.
Departing from the MFN obligation- appears especially justified in the
case of customs unions. See Haight, supra note 20, at 393 (arguing that MFN
principle should not prevent nations from creating larger entities and that
prior trading arrangements should not frustrate nations wishing to pool sover-
eignty by fully integrating their economies).
22. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 5.
23. See H. HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 117.
24. See id
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to the products entering the customs union territory from third
countries.25 In a free trade area, the constituent territories also
remove internal restrictions, but they do not establish common
external tariffs or a common customs administration. 26 The
Canada-United States agreement creates a free trade area in
which each country agrees to eliminate or reduce trade barriers
against the other while retaining its own system of trade barri-
ers against third countries.
1. Basic Rule of Article XXIV: Elimination of Substantially
All Trade Barriers
Although regional trade arrangements abrogate the MFN
principle by allowing members of the arrangement to treat
each other more favorably than nonmembers, the GATT draft-
ers recognized that regional trade agreements can serve as step-
ping stones to freer world trade.27  Regional trade
25. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 8(a).
Customs unions were an exception to the general principle of MFN even
before GATT. See J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE 12 (1950). Some com-
mentators argue that customary international law implies a customs union ex-
ception in every most-favored-nation clause of a commercial treaty, including
those treaties GATT does not govern. See Ustor, supra note 2, at 380-81.
Others disagree, however, maintaining that international law does not create
such an exception. See id. at 380. Proponents of the implied exception argue
that, because the GATT governs most world trade, states that accept GATT
ratify the customs union exception of article XXIV. Id. at 380-81. Article 38 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties recognizes that, under tradi-
tional principles of public international law, treaty rules bind third states
when those third states recognize them as rules of customary state practice.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 38, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 334 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980), reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
Opponents of the impled exception counter that non-parties to the GATT
do not apply article XXIV rules and that article XXIV, moreover, has not
achieved the level of general application necessary to become a rule of custom-
ary international law. See Ustor, supra note 2, at 380-81. Former Hungarian
ambassador Ustor concludes that despite some evidence that countries believe
that an implied customs union exception to MFN obligations exists, state prac-
tice does not support characterizing an implied customs union exception as a
rule of international law. Id. at 382-83.
26. See H. HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 117. The drafters of the ITO Char-
ter first included FTAs as part of the "regional exception" to MFN obligations
at the 1948 Havana Conference. See Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization, Mar. 24, 1948, art. 44, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/78, reprinted in U.N.
Doc. ICITO/1/4 (1948), and in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 3206, COMMER-
CIAL POLICY SERIES No. 113 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter]. The regional
exception previously had included only customs unions.
27. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 4 (stating that "[t]he con-
tracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the
1494 [Vol. 73:1488
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arrangements permit countries to adjust to the reduction of
protective trade barriers by reducing barriers first with only a
few countries. The GATT drafters also recognized, however,
that some countries could use regional arrangements to gain
unfair advantages with respect to nonmember trading part-
ners.28 Parties to a regional arrangement might hold an unfair
advantage if they could use article XXIV as an excuse for form-
ing "preference arrangements," in which members remove in-
ter-member trade barriers for only a few imported products.29
The GATT forbids preferential arrangements because they pri-
marily protect inefficient producers of these few products in
the member countries at the expense of producers of the prod-
ucts in nonmember countries.30
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the
economies of the countries parties to such agreements").
28. GATT article XXIV, paragraph 4, also states that "the purpose of a
customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the
constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other con-
tracting parties with such territories." Id; see also J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY,
supra note 8, at 455 (noting that negotiating nations feared other nations
would abuse regional arrangements "to establish trade preferences, defeating
the purpose of IN").
29. See Dam, Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT. The Leg-
acy of a Misconception, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 615, 633 (1963).
30. A preference agreement "is set up for the purpose of conferring a
privilege on producers within the system and imposing a handicap on external
competitors." C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 70 (1949). Preferen-
tial arrangements directly contravene the MFN principle codified in GATT ar-
ticle I. See Dam, supra note 29, at 616. Nonetheless, an article I "grandfather
clause" permits certain preferential arrangements existing at the time of
GATT formation. Id.; see GATT, supra note 1, art. I, paras. 2-3.
Some commentators have questioned the validity of the GATT's distinc-
tion between regional arrangements and preferential arrangements. Professor
Dam, for example, argues:
Since the tariff reductions inherent in such a preferential arrange-
ment might be considered a movement toward free trade, albeit not so
dramatic as that produced by a customs union or free-trade area, and
since such a preferential arrangement by definition involves less dis-
crimination against nonmembers than a customs union or free-trade
area, the justification for proscribing such arrangements absolutely is
not clear. Certainly it is strange to state, as Article XXIV in effect
declares, that discrimination is forbidden unless it is one hundred per
cent effective.
Dam, supra note 29, at 633-34 (footnote omitted).
Preferential arrangements are viewed as shelters for inefficient indus-
tries in the member countries of the preferential arrangement. See H. HAW-
KINS, supra note 20, at 114. Preferential trade arrangements harm
nonmember countries because these nations suffer economic loss when parties
to the agreement divert trade to themselves and exclude outsiders. See id. at
124-25. Additionally, preferential traders often increase general tariff rates,
which negatively affects nonmembers' trade. Id at 114. Preference arrange-
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To prevent valid regional trade arrangements from becom-
ing preference arrangements, article XXIV imposes stringent
requirements on the formation of regional agreements. First,
states making such agreements must eliminate restrictions with
respect to "substantially all the trade" between the coun-
tries."31 Article XXIV permits interim agreements that outline
the gradual elimination of trade barriers.32 An interim agree-
ment, however, must provide "a plan and schedule for the for-
mation of such a customs union or... free trade area within a
reasonable length of time. '3 3 Additionally, states may not im-
ments therefore tend to perpetuate high-cost production for participants and
to harm outsiders without significantly expanding production. Id. at 113. Be-
cause industry management and employees in the member countries to a pref-
erence arrangement desire to maintain the status quo, they oppose trade
barrier reductions that could significantly readjust production and create eco-
nomic efficiency. See H. HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 125. Thus, preferential
trade arrangements do not improve productivity and prosperity. 1d. In negoti-
ating the GATT, the United States sought to dismantle trade preferences. See
J. JACKSON, supra note 11, § 24.1, at 576.
A customs union or FTA, in contrast, creates a wider trading area in
which participating countries remove all trade restrictions. See C. WILCOX,
supra, at 67. Fewer obstacles to competition lead to more efficient allocation
of resources and, ultimately, to increased production and enhanced standards
of living. Id
The international community, including the United States, recognized re-
gional trade arrangements as a firmly established exception to MFN obliga-
tions before the formation of GATT. See J. VINER, supra note 25, at 6-14
(giving brief history of customs unions and MFN principle). At the GATT ne-
gotiations, the United States strongly opposed preferential arrangements, but
nevertheless conceded the importance of an exception for certain kinds of re-
gional arrangements. See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, § 24.1, at 576-77. In its
proposed draft of article XXIV, the United States expressly exempted certain
kinds of regional arrangements from general MFN obligations. 1d. § 24.1, at
577. According to one commentator, the United States negotiators allowed the
exemption of FTAs and customs unions in the GATT, despite their vehement
dislike of preferential arrangments and trade discrimination, in order to pro-
mote European recovery after World War II. Culbert, War-Time Anglo-Amer-
ican Talks and the Making of the GATT, 10 WORLD ECON. 381, 396 (1987).
31. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, paras. 8(a)(i), 8(b). GATT contracting
parties have not consistently defined substantially all trade. See J. JACKSON,
supra note 11, § 24.7, at 607-10. Removing 80 percent of all trade barriers prob-
ably would meet the GATT requirement. See Dam, supra note 29, at 635.
32. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 5 (providing that "the provisions
of this Agreement shall not prevent.., the adoption of an interim agreement
necessary for the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area").
33. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 5(c). The contracting parties to
the GATT have not clearly defined reasonable length of time. See J. JACK-
SON, supra note 11, § 24.6, at 605-07. Several working parties have suggested
that a period of 10 to 20 years would be reasonable time. See id. at 606.
Representatives of several signatories compose working parties. They dis-
cuss and review actions of other signatories that affect the other contracting
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pose trade barriers against nonmember countries that are more
restrictive than the barriers existing before the formation of
the agreement. 34 States also must notify the other GATT con-
tracting parties of their intention to enter into a regional trade
agreement,35 provide them with information relating to the
agreement,36 and, theoretically, obtain their approval of the
arrangement.3 7
parties. See Note, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area: Is it GATT Legal?, 1 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 199, 205 n.46 (1985).
While nations are negotiating a regional trade arrangement, the nations
can take advantage of article XXIV by operating under an "interim agree-
ment." GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, paras. 5(c), 7(a)-(c). Interim agree-
ments allow nations gradually to remove trade barriers and avoid the
disturbance that the sudden removal of trade barriers can cause to their econo-
mies. See J. VINER, supra note 25, at 125. Interim agreements thus are advan-
tageous because the removal of trade barriers can create shifts in production
that adversely affect employment and cause other hardships to the population.
See H. HAWKINS, supra note 20, at 118. By allowing the gradual establishment
of regional arrangements, the GATT furthers its objective of encouraging re-
gional arrangements. See J. VINER, supra note 25, at 125. The GATT automat-
ically exempts valid interim agreements from the requirements of article
XXIV. See Note, supra note 8, at 207 n.64.
A two-thirds majority of the GATT contracting parties can approve pro-
posed regional trade arrangements that do not comply fully with article
XXIV's requirements by waiving the requirements, "provided that such pro-
posals lead to the formation of a customs union or a free trade area in the
sense of this Article." GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 10.
Similarly, a two-thirds majority can waive GATT obligations "[i]n excep-
tional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement." GATT,
supra note 1, art. XXV, para. 5 (also providing that two-thirds majority must
"comprise more than half of the contracting parties"). Many nations have ob-
tained waivers for regional arrangements. As of 1974, contracting parties had
presented 34 regional arrangements to the GATT for approval. See Koh,
supra note 2, at 231 n.140. The GATT granted waivers to 11 of those 34 re-
gional arrangements. Id. at 231 n.142.
34. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 5(a)-(b).
35. Id. at para. 7(a).
36. Id.
37. Id at para. 7(b). Paragraph 7(b) provides:
If, after having studied the plan and schedule included in an interim
agreement referred to in paragraph 5 in consultation with the parties
to that agreement and taking due account of the information made
available in accordance with the provisions of sub-paragraph (a), the
CONTRACTING PARTIES find that such agreement is not likely to
result in the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area
within the period contemplated by the parties to the agreement or
that such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES shall make recommendations to the parties to the agreement.
The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be,
such agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance
with these recommendations.
1989] GATT 1497
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GATT's enforcement of article XXIV has a checkered his-
tory; since the formation of GATT, no regional arrangement
has conformed completely to article XXIV rules.38 The GATT
contracting parties, however, never have rejected a regional
arrangement. 39
2. Exceptions to the General Rule
Although the drafters of article XXIV believed that requir-
ing members of a regional trade arrangement to eliminate sub-
stantially all barriers among them would reduce the abuses of
"preferential" arrangements, the drafters neverthless recog-
nized the necessity for some exceptions to the remove-all-barri-
ers rule. Paragraph eight of article XXIV therefore provides
six exceptions that refer to six other GATT articles.40 Article
XXIV defines regional arrangements as "customs territories" in
which "duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce
(except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI,
XII, XIII, XIV, XV, and XX) are eliminated with respect to
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories
... in products originating in such territories. '41 Article XI
permits the imposition of quotas necessary to protect agricul-
38. See Raworth, Economic Integration, the GATT and Canada-United
States Free Trade, 18 OTTAwA L. REV. 259, 271 (1986).
39. Normally, parties raise objections to nonconforming agreements and
then tolerate the arrangements. Id. As a result, two-thirds of the contracting
parties belong to regional arrangements that are inconsistent with GAIT re-
quirements. Id. Commenting on this state of affairs, Professor Jackson asserts
that article XXIV is "largely irrelevant." Id. (citing J. JACKSON, J. LouIs &
M. MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTATING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITU-
TIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES 621 (1984)).
Some commentators argue that article XXIV's vague requirements that
parties eliminate trade barriers for "substantially all the trade" within a "rea-
sonable length of time" cause the compliance problem. See Haight, supra note
20, at 397 (quoting GAIT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, paras. 8(b), 5(c)). Haight
argues that "[no] other critically important provisions of the GATT leave such
difficult tasks of interpretation to the judgment of the Contracting Parties."
Id. In Professor Dam's view, although "Article XXIV appears, on first impres-
sion, to set forth a precise set of rules for determining the circumstances under
which regional arrangements will be permitted[, t]he apparent precision is
quite illusory." Dam, supra note 29, at 619.
40. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 8. The exceptions to the prohi-
bition on trade barriers are found in the following GATT articles: article XI
(Exceptions to the General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions); article
XII (Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments); article XIII (Non-
discriminatory Administration of Quantitative Restrictions); article XIV (Ex-
ceptions to the Rule of Non-discrimination); article XV (Exchange Arrange-
ments); and article XX (General Exceptions). GATT, supra note 1.
41. GAIT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, paras. 8(a)(1), 8(b).
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tural price support programs; articles XII, XIII, XIV, and XV
allow trade and monetary restrictions for balance-of-payments
purposes, and article XX permits restrictions needed for rea-
sons of health, safety, law enforcement, and similar "police
power" purposes.42
The exceptions include many of the exceptions to the MFN
rule and GATT's general prohibition of nontariff trade barriers
that were well-established in pre-GATT trade agreements. 43
42. See GATT, supra note 1, arts. XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XX.
43. See C. WILCOX, supra note 30, at 180-84. An example of pre-GATT ex-
ceptions is the exception to the general prohibition of quantitative restrictions
(quotas) on imports, which allows nations to enforce the classification and
grading of commodities. Id A similar exception, embodied in GATT article
XI, applies to regional arrangements under the GATT. GATT, supra note 1,
art. XI, para. 2(b). Pre-GATT treaties also frequently included provisions
analogous to those in GATT article XX, which exempt the protection of na-
tional treasures or measures necessary to protect public health or safety from
commitments to reduce trade barriers. See C. WILCOX, supra note 30, at 181;
Havana Charter, supra note 26, art. 45, para. 1(a). Article XX is an exception
to the article XXIV requirement that regional agreements remove all trade
barriers. See supra note 7.
The article XXIV list includes temporary exceptions, such as the article
XI provision that permits export restrictions to rectify critical shortages of
food stuffs or other essentials. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 2(a). Ar-
ticle XX provisions allow restrictions on the distribution of products in short
supply. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX, para. j. The Havana Charter also
contained provisions for the control of prices and the liquidation of war sur-
pluses and industries. Havana Charter, supra note 26, art. 45, para. 1(b).
The provisions in GATT articles XII through XV permit the use of quotas
for balance-of-payment problems. The analogous Havana Charter provisions
appear in articles 21 through 24. Havana Charter, supra note 26.
The drafters probably viewed the temporary provisions as transitional
ones, designed to aid countries through the economic difficulties of the post-
war period. See C. WILCOX, supra note 30, at 181. Various criteria, procedures,
time limitations, and additional obligations limit the use of these provisions.
See id. at 183-84. The Havana Charter articles also required parties to obtain
International Monetary Fund approval before invoking some of the temporary
exceptions. See id
The United States's original charter proposal for an international trade or-
ganization contained an exception to the quantitative restrictions prohibition
to allow nations to adjust for balance of payments problems. See J. JACKSON,
supra note 11, § 26.2, at 678. The provision did not change significantly during
the GATT and ITO Charter negotiations. See id. § 26.2, at 679. Professor
Brown notes that the balance of payments exceptions codified in the Havana
Charter are the only provisions of major importance which "allow members
resorting to the balance-of-payments exception to apply quantitative restric-
tions in a discriminatory manner... [and are the only ones] that apply specifi-
cally and solely to a postwar transition period." W. BROWN, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RESTORATION OF WORLD TRADE 197-98 (1950).
The Havana Charter reflects this concern in article 21, which addresses
restrictions to safeguard the balance of payments, and in article 23, which ad-
dresses exceptions to the rule of non-discrimination:
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The negotiating history does not explain why the drafters chose
those particular exceptions and neglected other common excep-
tions, such as article XXI, which allows restrictions for the pro-
tection of security interests, and article XIX safeguards.44
The Members recognize that in the early years of the Organization all
of them will be confronted in varying degrees with problems of eco-
nomic adjustment resulting from the war. During this period the Or-
ganization shall, when required to take decisions under this Article or
under Article 23, take full account of the difficulties of post-war ad-
justment and of the need which a Member may have to use import
restrictions as a step towards the restoration of equilibrium in its bal-
ance of payments on a sound and lasting basis.... The Members rec-
ognize that the aftermath of the war has brought difficult problems of
economic adjustment which do not permit the immediate full achieve-
ment of non-discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions
Havana Charter, supra note 26, art. 21, para. 4(a), art. 23, para. 1(a).
The Havana Charter's exception for balance of payment quantitative re-
strictions had costs for those states invoking the exception. The exception
"[gave] rise to 'secondary' rights and obligations." W. BROWN, supra, at 191.
44. The parenthetical list of exceptions first appeared in the final March
1948 draft of the Havana Charter, after being added at the final plenary con-
ference. Havana Charter, supra note 26, art. 44, para. 4. Like GATT article
XXIV, the Havana Charter defines the exceptions to the requirements for re-
gional arrangements by reference to other charter articles. Id These articles
have direct counterparts in the GATT. No prior drafts of the Havana Charter
provided these exceptions. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 2927, COMMER-
CIAL POLICY SERIES No. 106, DRAFT CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 42 (1947) [hereinafter GENEVA
DRAFT]; U.N. Conf on Trade and Employment: Report of the Drafting Com-
mittee of the Preparatory Committee, art. 38, para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/34
(1947) [hereinafter New York Draft] (U.N. Archives Microfilm ESCOR Docu-
ments); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 2728, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES No.
98, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CHARTER FOR THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZA-
TION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, art. 38, para. 5 (1946) [hereinafter LONDON
DRAFT]; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE PUB. No. 2598, COMMERCIAL POLICY SERIES No.
93, SUGGESTED CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, art. 33, para. 4 (1946) [hereinafter SUGGESTED CHARTER].
Similarly, the October 30, 1947, GATT text does not include the article XXIV
exceptions. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV.
The parenthetical exceptions first appeared in the negotiating documents
of the Joint Sub-Committee on Tariff Preference in a draft revision of article
42. U.N. Conf on Trade and Employment: Draft Revision of Article 42, para.4,
U.N. Doc. E/Conf.2/C.2&3/A/13 (1948) (U.N. Archives Microfilm ESCOR Doc-
uments). No account of committee discussions accompany the draft. Id. Sub-
sequent documents include the parenthetical exceptions without explanation.
See, e.g., UV Conf. on Trade and Employment. Report of Working Party to
Joint Committee on Articles 15, 16 and 42, Annex 1, para. 4, U.N. Doc. E/Conf.
2/C. 2&3/A/14 (1948) (U.N. Archives Microfilm ESCOR Documents); U.N.
Conf. on Trade and Employment: Joint Sub-Committee Report to Committee
III on Articles 16 and 42, para. 27, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.3/78 (1948) (U.N.
Archives Microfilm ESCOR Documents); U.N. Conf on Trade and Employ-
ment: Draft Articles 16, 42, 42A and 42B as Adopted by Committee III, para. 4,
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C. ARTICLE XIX SAFEGUARDS
1. The Purpose and Requirements of Article XIX
Conspicuously absent from the list of exceptions to article
XXIV is GATT article XIX, entitled "Emergency Action on
Imports of Particular Products." Known as the "escape
clause, '45 article XIX allows a GATT contracting party, under
certain emergency circumstances, to raise trade barriers, also
called "safeguards," 46 that otherwise would violate trade obliga-
tions or concessions negotiated under the GATT. To invoke
these provisions, the contracting party must need the barriers
to protect its own domestic industries from products imported
into the contracting party's territory "in such increased quanti-
ties and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious
injury to domestic producers .. .of like or directly competitive
U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 2/C.3/85 (1948) (U.N. Archives Microfilm ESCOR
Documents).
45. See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, § 23.1, at 553. GATT drafters included
article XIX largely at the insistence of the United States. See C. WILCOx,
supra note 31, at 182-83. The United States negotiators conditioned their ac-
ceptance of the Charter on the inclusion of the safeguards exception and a pro-
vision allowing parties to apply quotas against agricultural products as a
response to domestic price support programs. Article XIX of the GATT codi-
fies the safeguards exception; article XI, paragraph 2(c), codifies the agricul-
tural quota provision. See id. The United States began demanding escape
clauses in all of its international trade agreements in the 1940s. See Exec. Or-
der No. 9,832, 3 C.F.R. 624, 625 (1948); Trade Agreements Extension Act of
1951, Pub.L. No. 50-141, 1951 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS (50 Stat.) 70.
GATT article XIX is modeled on the United States-Mexican Trade Agreement
of December 23, 1942. Trade Agreement, Dec. 23, 1942, United States-Mexico,
57 Stat. 833-51, E.A.S. No. 311 (effective Jan. 30, 1943).
GATT article XIX developed from a draft safeguards provision submitted
by the United States. See SUGGESTED CHARTER, supra note 44, art. 29; R.
HUDEC, THE GATT LEGAL SYSTEM & WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY 14-15 (1975).
46. According to one commentator, international trade law frequently
uses the terms safeguard and escape clause synonymously. See Note, A Pro-
posed Modification of U.S. Import Relief Measures in the Context of a U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement: Safeguard, Countervail and Antidumping, 17
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 99, 102-03 (1987). Technically, both terms refer to re-
lief that permits a country to "escape" from concessions to reduce trade barri-
ers. Id. A true escape clause requires a causal relationship; to invoke the
escape clause successfully, a country must attribute an influx of injurious im-
ports to a trade concession. Id. at 103. For instance, section 201 of the United
States Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1982), provides that United
States industries seriously injured by imports may obtain temporary relief
from all imports of a particular product. See Note, supra, at 101-03. Section
201 is not a true escape clause, however, because it permits industries to nul-
lify a concession without presenting evidence that the concession is causing the
influx of injurious imports. Id. at 103.
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products. ' ' 47 By design, article XIX allows governments to aid
industries that are "no longer internationally competitive. '48
GATT scholars generally agree that, outside the regional trade
arrangement context, safeguard measures must apply according
to the MFN principle.49 Thus, a country invoking safeguards
against a certain product to protect a domestic industry must
apply those safeguards to imports of that product from every
country.
47. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX, para. 1(a). In addition to these require-
ments, the GATT requires that the importation be an "unforeseen develop-
ment" that results from an "obligation incurred" under the GATT, usually a
trade concession reducing or eliminating a trade barrier. This requirement has
had little meaning, however, since the Hatters' Fur Case. REPORT ON THE
WITHDRAWAL BY THE UNITED STATES OF A TARIFF CONCESSION UNDER ARTI-
CLE XIX OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, U.N. Sales No.
GATT/1951-3 (1951). In that case, Czechoslovakia challenged the United
States's withdrawal of a negotiated trade concession for hatters' furs. The
United States defended the withdrawal, claiming that an unforeseen develop-
ment-change in ladies' hat styles-had increased imports. Id- at 10. Despite
its finding that fashions are subject to constant change and that the United
States had known this when it granted the trade concession, the deci-
sionmakers concluded that the United States had satisfied the unforeseen de-
velopments criteria, because it could not have foreseen the degree to which the
fashion change would increase imports. Id. at 12. After the Hatters'Fur Case,
nations apparently can justify safeguards based on any substantial increase in
imports, even foreseeable increases, because the degree of a given import's im-
pact always will be "unforeseeable." See J. JACKSON, supra note 11, § 23.3, at
561.
48. See Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GATT, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 41,
41 (1981). The GATT drafters chose to provide more protections to industries
in importing countries than in exporting countries. Id. By providing partici-
pating governments a means to escape economic injury, the GATT safeguards
encourage greater commitment to free trade. Id.
49. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 604 (arguing that a
GATT panel would rule that article XIX remedies require MFN treatment).
The matter has been the subject of considerable discussion. See, e.g., Bronck-
ers, Reconsidering the Non-Discrimination Principle as Applied to GATT
Safeguard Measures: A Rejoinder, 1983/2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION
113 (suggesting new safeguards code); Bronckers, The Non-Discriminatory Ap-
plication of Article XIX GATT: Fact or Fiction, 1981/2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR.
INTEGRATION 39 (arguing that article XIX is at best ambiguous as to its nondis-
criminatory application); Koulen, The Non-Discriminatory Application of
GATT Article XIX(1): A Reply, 1983/2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 87
(arguing that article XIX permits only non-discriminatory safeguards).
The language of article XIX does not explicitly require nondiscriminatory
application. Documents pertaining to the drafting of article 40 of the Havana
Charter, the direct predecessor of GATT article XIX, support an implicit MFN
requirement. In particular, an interpretive note to article 40 of the Havana
Charter states that any "suspension, withdrawal or modification" pursuant to
the safeguard provisions "must not discriminate against imports from any
Member country." Havana Charter, supra note 26, Annex P (ad art. 40).
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Even though article XXIV does not list article XIX as an
exception to the required elimination of substantially all trade
barriers between members of a regional agreement, article 1102
of the Canada-United States FTA50 and several other regional
agreements expressly permit the application of article XIX
safeguards against regional arrangement partners.51 The ab-
sence of an express article XIX exception to article XXIV in
the GATT could be read to suggest that the United States-Can-
ada ETA safeguard provision violates the GATT.
2. Applying an Article XIX Exception
Even if article XIX is a legal exception to article XXIV's
requirement that regional trading partners remove "substan-
tially all trade barriers"-despite the lack of explicit article
XXIV permission-the application of safeguards among mem-
bers of a free trade arrangement remains a problem. Article
XXIV merely permits countries belonging to regional trade ar-
50. See supra note 6 (quoting article 1102 language).
51. Some major regional arrangements among industrialized countries
that provide for safeguards include: Convention Establishing the European
Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, art. 20, 370 U.N.T.S. 3; Agreement Estab-
lishing a Free Trade Area, June 5, 1966, United Kingdom and Northern Ire-
land-Ireland, art. XIX, 1966 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 31, 565 U.N.T.S. 58, reprinted in
5 I.L.M. 321 (1966); Israel-United States: Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22,
1985, art. 5, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 653 (1985); Agreement Between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the Republic of Austria, July 22, 1972, art. 27
(2), 1 Collection of the Agreements Concluded by the European Communities,
7, 16 (1977), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, Vol.
B II (European Community Treaties), at 1312-198 (K. Simmonds ed. 1974);
New Zealand-Australia: Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement, Mar. 28,
1983, art. 17, New Zealand Treaty Series 1983, No. 1, A. 20, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 945, 967 (1983).
The only other full FTA to which the United States is a party, the U.S.-
Israel FTA, also contains a safeguards provision. U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note
8. Article 5 of the U.S.-Israel FTA provides for "Relief from Injury Caused by
Import Competition." The article implicitly allows for the "suspension of the
reduction or elimination of any duty provided for by this Agreement" when
the "serious injury or threat thereof.., is substantially caused by ... the re-
duction or elimination of duty provided for by this Agreement," id. art. 5, para.
2, and only after the "importing Party... consult[s] with the other Party in
accordance with Article 18 before taking any action affecting the trade of the
other Party," id. art. 5, para. 1. In addition, "[w]hen, in the view of the import-
ing Party, the importation of a product from the other Party is not a signifi-
cant cause of the serious injury or threat thereof .... the importing Party may
except the product of the other Party from any import relief that may be im-
posed with respect to imports of that product from third countries." Id. art. 5,
para. 3. Thus, when the importing country imposes safeguard measures
against third countries, it might exempt the other party to the agreement from
the import relief.
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rangements to apply the enumerated protective measures
against regional trade partners. The article XXIV text does not
indicate whether measures must be applied to regional partners
when they are applied against other countries not parties to the
agreement.52 In article 1102 of the Canada-United States agree-
ment, the parties retain an option to apply article XIX safe-
guards against each other when they apply safeguards against
third parties.5 3 Whether, in those circumstances, the countries
not only may, but must, impose safeguards against each other
to comply with article XIX law is an open question.
The potential volatility of this issue became evident when
the European Economic Community ("EEC") 54 and the Euro-
pean Free Trade Area ("EFTA")55 sought GATT working
party56 approval for their regional trade agreements. Although
the working party did not reach a final conclusion, some mem-
bers of the working party believed that the application of safe-
guards against nonmember states, but not against member
states, violated the GATT MFN principle.57 The EEC contested
this view.5 8
52. For example, article XXIV states that regional trade arrangement
members may abrogate the general rule of eliminating all trade barriers when
necessary to impose balance of payment protections under article XIII. GATT,
supra note 1, art. XXIV. Article XXIV does not clarify, however, whether
members must apply balance of payments protections equally to members and
nonmembers. Thus, the problem of how to apply an article XIX exception is
equally relevant to all of the article XXIV, paragraph 8, exceptions.
53. See supra note 6 (quoting article 1102 language).
54. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 4.
55. Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4,
1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
56. See supra note 33 (describing working parties).
57. See GATT, BISD, supra note 1, supp. 20, at 156 (examining Austrian
Agreement); id. at 166-69 (examining agreement with Iceland); id. at 181 (ex-
amining agreement with Portugal).
58. See id. supp. 20, at 156, 169, 181, 194, 207. The working party assigned
to the EFTA agreement held the opposite view. See id supp. 9, at 79 (examin-
ing Stockholm Convention).
Discussing this disagreement, Professor Raworth asserts that because the
language of article XXIV, paragraph 8(b), fails to list article XIX as an excep-
tion to the removal of trade barriers in a free trade area, it is doubtful that
application of safeguard measures against FTA partners violates the IFN
principle. Raworth, supra note 38, at 270. Another commentator similarly has
speculated that "although the GATT requires the application of safeguard
measures on a most-favored-nation basis, exempting Canada from that rule
would likely be consistent with the GATT article XXIV requirement that free
trade areas eliminate substantially all 'restrictive regulations of commerce.'"
Note, supra note 46, at 107. Professor Koulen notes, however, that the text of
article XXIV, paragraph 8, is ambiguous. Koulen, supra note 49, at 102. If ar-
ticle XXIV's drafters intended to exempt other members of a regional ar-
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Thus, the Canada-United States agreement may violate the
GATT in two ways. First, the agreement allows the two coun-
tries to apply article XIX safeguard measures against each
other, even though GATT article XXIV fails to list article XIX
as an exception to the general rule that members of a free
trade arrangement must, eliminate substantially all trade barri-
ers among them.59 Second, even if article XIX constitutes an
implied exception to article XXIV, the Canada-United States
agreement may violate article XIX because it does not require
the two countries to apply the safeguards against each other
whenever they apply them against third countries.60
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFORMING WITH GATT
Canadian and United States policymakers might be
tempted to consider the GATT legality of the Canada-United
States FTA unimportant. No one is likely to challenge the
agreement,61 and GATT's past enforcement of article XXIV re-
quirements has been lax.62 Conforming the Canada-United
States FTA to GATT rules, however, is important to both coun-
rangement from the restrictions of article XIX, paragraph 1, he argues, it is
difficult to understand why article XXIV, paragraph 8, refers to article XIII,
which provides for nondiscriminatory application of quantitative restrictions.
Id& Given this ambiguity, Professor Koulen finds it unsurprising that the
nexus between article XXIV and article XIX remains unsettled. Id.
59. See supra notes 40-45 and accompanying text. GATT contracting par-
ties retain their right to invoke article XIX safeguard measures upon entry
into a regional arrangement. Neither article XIV nor article XXIV forbids
countries belonging to regional arrangements from invoking safeguards
against nonmember countries. See Koulen, supra note 49, at 102 (stating that
"the disagreement concerns the question whether Article XXIV can be in-
voked as a valid reason for making an exception to the requirement of non-
discriminatory application of Article XIX (1)").
GATT scholars generally agree that article XIX applies as an exception
during any interim agreement, provided that member countries are phasing
out trade restrictions. They reason that the interim agreement operates dur-
ing a transitional period when the full paragraph 8(b) requirements do not yet
apply. See, e.g., Raworth, supra note 38, at 270.
60. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. The Canada-United States
FTA therefore reflects a tension between GATT article XXIV, which appar-
ently does not allow countries in a free trade agreement to apply safeguard
measures against each other, and article XIX, which requires countries to in-
yoke safeguard measures equally against all countries where the damaging im-
ports originate.
Nothing in the text of article XIX indicates that contracting parties be-
longing to regional trade arrangements should apply safeguard provisions dif-
ferently to regional trade partners.
61. See Koh, supra note 2, at 230-31 & nn.139-40.
62. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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tries. In recent years, the United States has sought to improve
its credibility among the GATT contracting parties in the hope
of encouraging broader compliance with the GATT.63 United
States compliance with GATT rules will enhance this credibil-
ity. Meaningful GATT compliance in a free trade agreement
with the United States also benefits Qanada. Because Canada
currently depends heavily on trade with the United States, it
may achieve greater stability, autonomy, and growth by ex-
panding its trade to other international markets.64 Canada
could achieve such trade diversification best through multilat-
eral trade negotiations in accordance with a GATT system of
rules that GATT contracting parties recognize and follow. 65
For Canada and the United States openly to flout GATT rules
in their joint free trade agreement might undermine article
XXIV rules or encourage other states to enter openly "prefer-
ential" trade arrangements. 66 In addition, resolution of the
long-disputed article XXIV issue will help existing and future
free trade agreements function within the GATT system. Thus,
63. The United States wishes to bolster its credibility as a strong propo-
nent of GATT and as a critic of other free trade arrangements. See Recent
Development, supra note 8, at 228. Despite initial hesitation, the United States
"has recently been almost alone in seeking a more conscientious application of
the rules." Haight, supra note 20, at 399.
64. Canada's participation in the Canada-United States FTA is likely to
facilitate development of a new set of principles for international trade, which
could lead to freer trade with other countries. See Wolff, supra note 3, at 229-
30. In addition, Canada will benefit from readier access to the vast United
States market, especially because geography links the countries. Unhindered
by tariff barriers, newly developed technology will transfer easily, thus im-
proving both productivity and efficiency. Id.
65. See Raworth, supra note 38, at 280-81 (noting importance of Canada-
United States agreement covering "substantially all trade").
66. According to one commentator, if the United States breaches the re-
quirements of article XXIV, other nations may feel free to form single com-
modity "free-trade" arrangements or preferential agreements. See Recent
Development, supra note 8, at 228.
In addition, regional trade arrangements are potentially politically sensi-
tive. Professor Dam notes that the "world-wide impact of customs unions
makes their creation and implementation of common concern to all Con-
tracting Parties." Dam, supra note 29, at 637. Although article XXIV allows
abrogation of the MFN principle in the formation of a regional trade arrange-
ment, countries not parties to the agreement understandably may fear trade
diversion when the regional trade area is formed; the products of those coun-
tries will remain subject to current import restrictions, while tariffs and quo-
tas will no longer burden the products traded between members of the
regional arrangement. This would occur if two countries formed a free trade
area, but one country bought from the other, now tariff-free, what it once had
purchased from a nonmember importer still subject to tariffs. See J. JACKSON
& W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 455.
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determining the proper application of safeguards in a regional
agreement will both clarify and strengthen article XXIV.
II. THE LEGITIMACY OF ARTICLE XIX SAFEGUARDS
AS AN EXCEPTION TO ARTICLE XXIV
The first step in evaluating the GATT legality of article
1102 of the Canada-United States FTA is to consider whether
article XIX safeguards provide a legitimate exception to article
XXIV's requirement that members of regional trade arrange-
ments remove trade barriers among themselves. Although the
omission of an article XIX exception from article XXIV argua-
bly precludes the application of safeguards against regional
trade partners, analysis reveals no apparent reason for the
omission. Policy considerations and the practical consequences
of acknowledging safeguards as a valid exception compel the
conclusion that article XIX is a legitimate exception to article
XXIV requirements.
A. REASONS FOR THE ABSENCE OF AN EXPRESS ARTICLE XIX
EXCEPTION
The text of article XXIV does not reveal why the excep-
tions to article XXIV include only the articles listed, or why ar-
ticle XIX is not a listed exception. Each of the exceptions
listed in paragraph 8 of article XXIV was either well-estab-
lished in pre-GATT international law or a provision that of-
fered temporary relief from immediate problems of the early
post-war era.67 In contrast, safeguard measures, which are tem-
porary by design,68 were not an established part of pre-GATT
trade agreements. 69 The contracting parties therefore simply
may have overlooked article XIX as an exception to article
XXIV. The absence of any discussion in the negotiating history
of the article XXIV exceptions suggests that the negotiators
gave little consideration to the list of exceptions.7 0
On the other hand, the contracting parties may have ex-
cluded article XIX from the article XXIV exceptions deliber-
ately. Article XIX has few restraints; countries can decide
unilaterally the necessity for safeguards and can impose them
67. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
68. GATT requires contracting parties to apply safeguards only "to the
extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such in-
jury." GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX, para. 1(a).
69. See supra note 46.
70. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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without any kind of prior GATT approval.71 Perhaps the con-
tracting parties perceived the exception as susceptible to abuse
and feared that countries operating under the guise of a re-
gional arrangement might invoke a safeguards exception to
limit the removal of trade barriers to only some imports, while
retaining significant barriers as "safeguards" on other im-
ports.72 Such a sham effectively could operate as a GATT-for-
bidden preference arrangement. The final version of GATT,
however, contains other provisions in the paragraph 8 list that
are as unrestricted as article XIX.73 For example, article XII,
like article XIX, allows countries seeking to impose the trade
71. See GAIT, supra note 1, art. XIX.
72. Industries and their employees often claim injury due to trade obliga-
tions or unforeseen developments. See J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8,
at 539. Those industries assert that freer trade policies have caused them "to
bear an undue proportion of the costs for society's general gains." Id. The
plight of such noncompetitive industries arouses substantial political sympathy
and creates pressures for protection. Id at 540.
73. In addition to fearing the "openness" of article XIX, it is possible that
the contracting parties may have excluded article XIX from paragraph 8's list
of exceptions because tariffs and quotas have different effects on imports. Ar-
ticle XIX authorizes both tariffs and quotas as a safeguard measure. Quotas,
or quantitative restrictions on the import of a product, tend to burden each im-
porter in proportion to the importer's share of the total imports of the prod-
uct, because the quota usually makes each importer bear a pro-rata share of
the reduction in imports. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XIII 2(c) (requiring
that countries imposing quotas do so nondiscriminatorily, either by seeking
agreement with supplying countries about allocation of quota shares or by al-
lotting quota shares proportionally among substantial suppliers of imports).
Suppose, for example, that the United States imports 1000 heavy motorcycles
per year, that 900 of the vehicles originate in Japan, which does not have a
free trade arrangement with the United States, and that 100 come from Can-
ada, which has a free trade arrangement with the United States. A United
States quota limiting heavy motorcycle imports to 500 usually will be con-
strued to burden Japan and Canada in proportion to their respective shares of
the import market-allowing 450 Japanese and 50 Canadian motorcycles to
enter the United States. Thus, members of regional arrangements will bear
the quota burden in proportion to their share of an import market.
Tariffs, on the other hand, do not have the same proportional effect. If a
country imposes flat safeguard tariff measures against all countries including
its regional arrangement partners, those partner countries, which formerly im-
ported without any tariff at all, will carry a proportionally greater burden.
This is so because the imports of third countries likely have been subject al-
ready to some tariffs; the additional cost to third country imports therefore
will be the difference between the previous and the new safeguard tariff rates.
Member countries' imports, however, suddenly will have the burden of the en-
tire safeguard tariff to carry. Thus, safeguard tariffs do not increase trade re-
striction burdens proportionally measured against the market conditions that
exist at the time the safeguard is imposed, but rather unfairly affect member
countries. This suggests that the GATT contracting parties may have thought
that the imposition of safeguard tariffs against member countries would be un-
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barriers to act unilaterally, without preliminary approval by
the GATT contracting parties.7 4
A better counterargument to the view that the drafters de-
liberately excluded article XIX asserts that the drafters never
intended the paragraph 8 list of exceptions to be exhaustive.
One commentator observes that parties to a regional trade ar-
rangement probably feel entitled to invoke other GATT articles
as exceptions even though the exceptions do not to appear in
paragraph 8(b).7 5 Article XXI, for example, states that parties
may not construe a part of the GATT to require any nation to
act contrary to the protection of national security interests or
United Nations obligations. 76 Article XXIV also must allow
members of a regional trade arrangement to impose barriers
against each other for reasons of national security. The likeli-
hood that parties would not provide exceptions for a nation's
fair and therefore intentionally omitted article XIX safeguards as an exception
to article XXIV.
74. GATT, supra note 1, arts. XI, XII.
One commentator argues that article XIX is an impermissible exception
to article XXIV, because nations enter regional agreements to prod each un-
productive domestic industry to restructure its operations and "concentrate[s]
on those areas where it has a comparative advantage. Note, supra note 46, at
103. Permitting safeguard protection even after the implementation of a re-
gional trade arrangement, the argument goes, allows nations to coddle uncom-
petitive domestic industries and to decrease their ability to compete effectively
in the expanded market. Such coddling, the argument concludes, "substan-
tially undermine[s] the economic goal of the signatories." Id- at 103 (quoting 1
MINISTER OF SUPPLY AND SERVICES CANADA REPORT: ROYAL COMMISSION ON
THE ECONOMIC UNION AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR CANADA 315 (1985)).
This view therefore rejects safeguard exceptions to article XXIV requirements
once the regional arrangement is fully implemented. I&L at 103-04 (advocating
that safeguards be available against regional arrangement partners only during
transition period, as in Australia-New Zealand Trade Agreement). The GATT
currently allows the impostion of safeguards during the transitional period
leading to implementation. Id. at 105-07. Most commentators agree that the
full requirements of article XXIV, paragraph 8 do not apply during the transi-
tional period. See, e.g., Raworth, supra note 38, at 270.
An opposing view that is more realistic recognizes that some industries
have difficulty adjusting to regional trade agreements and that these difficul-
ties necessitate the continuing availability of safeguards. Many free trade
agreements allow parties to employ safeguards beyond the transitional period
but eventually restrict their use. Raworth, supra note 38, at 270. Some of
these restrictions require the member countries to explore alternatives with
each other before applying safeguards. Another restriction permits unilateral
application of safeguards during a transitional period, but requires multilateral
authorization to impose safeguards later. Id.
75. See J. ALLEN, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND THE GATT 198-
99 (1960) (arguing that parties should consider article XVIII among the
GATT's exceptions).
76. See id
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sovereign right to provide for its own security seems remote, at
best, even though article XXI is not a listed exception to article
XXIV.7 7 Thus, by analogy, the GATT contracting parties prob-
ably did not intend to require a country to surrender the sover-
eign right to protect industries vital to its economy in an
emergency situation. An examination of GATT policy bolsters
this interpretation.
B. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF AN ARTICLE XIX EXCEPTION
A number of practical policy considerations support inter-
preting article XXIV to include an article XIX exception. The
GATT permits regional trade arrangements based on the gener-
ally-held view that such agreements facilitate trade among con-
stitutent territories and are consistent with the general purpose
of GATT to eliminate trade barriers among all GATT con-
tracting parties.78 The willingness of many contracting parties
to reduce trade barriers in a limited regional arrangement to a
lower level and earlier than they would on a world-wide basis7 9
demonstrates the usefulness of regional arrangements in
achieving the GATT goals. Practical analysis therefore must
weigh the benefits of regional agreements as a stepping stone
toward world-wide reductions in trade barriers against the costs
of regionalism. The principal cost of regional arrangements is
that they abrogate the MFN principle by allowing members to
favor each other over nonmembers.8 0 The inclusion of article
XXIV in the GATT agreement indicates that the MFN princi-
ple must yield to the political reality that many countries will
move toward a significant reduction of trade barriers only by
beginning on a regional basis-with a few, rather than all, trad-
ing partners.
A parallel argument suggests that article XXIV's remove-
all-barriers requirement must yield to the political reality that
many nations simply will refuse to enter into regional trade ar-
rangements unless they can invoke safeguard measures to pro-
tect domestic industries that face serious injury from import
competition. Many countries entering into regional arrange-
ments evidently have felt that some industries have difficulty
adjusting and that these difficulties necessitate the continuing
77. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 8.
78. See supra note 4.
79. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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availability of safeguards.8 1 If the benefits of freer trade in a
regional arrangement outweigh the costs of allowing a safe-
guards exception, perhaps article XXIV should bend with the
"strong wind"8 2 of international practice and allow a safeguards
exception. After years of looking the other way when con-
tracting parties form regional arrangements that allow some
safeguards,8 3 the GATT should recognize the practice of many
countries.84 By explicitly recognizing a safeguards exception,
the contracting parties can clarify the GATT and maintain the
credibility of the GATT system.
In sum, because the GATT text and history do not clearly
preclude an article XIX exception to article XXIV, and because
most nations entering into regional trade arrangements have
retained authority to impose some safeguards, the contracting
parties should amend the GATT explicitly to allow safeguard
measures as an article XXIV exception or, or at a minimum,
deem them authorized in the GATT's present form.8 5 Such an
interpretation or amendment would make article XXIV more
attuned to the realities present when regional arrangements
are formed by authorizing terms more acceptable to countries
considering such arrangements. Moreover, such an interpreta-
tion is necessary to make article 1102 of the Canada-United
States FTA legal under the GATT. Recognizing a safeguards
exception, however, is not sufficient in itself. The legality of an
Article XIX exception will depend on its proper application.
III. APPLICATION OF AN ARTICLE XIX EXCEPTION
TO ARTICLE XXIV
Interpreting or amending article XXIV to include article
XIX safeguard measures among the accepted exceptions to arti-
cle XXIV's basic requirement that members of a regional trade
arrangement eliminate substantially all trade barriers leaves
open the question of how to apply the exception. The Canada-
81. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
82. See Haight, supra note 20, at 399.
83. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (noting that GATT con-
tracting parties have accepted all proposed FTAs despite nonconformance with
GA'IT rules).
84. See supra note 51 (listing major regional arrangements that retain
safeguard provisions).
85. Professors Jackson and Davey view de facto amendment of GATT, at
least in the context of recognizing tariffs as a legitimate means to rectify bal-
ance of payment problems, as "dangerous," but do not explain their view. See
J. JACKSON & W. DAVEY, supra note 8, at 876.
1989] GATT 1511
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
United States FTA suggests that Canada or the United States
may apply safeguards against each other, but the FTA does not
say that the two must apply the safeguards against each other
when they invoke safeguards against other countries. Indeed,
article 1102 of the agreement states that a member country
must not apply safeguards when the other member is only a
small part of the problem. A careful reading of GATT articles
XIX and XXIV and consideration of GATT policy reveal that
safeguards must apply to both members and nonmembers of a
regional trade arrangement. In other words, parties must apply
the safeguards according to the MFN principle.
A. THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE XXIV AND ARTICLE XIX
Article XXIV, paragraph 8, does not indicate whether a
contracting party invoking one of the article's exceptions must
apply the resulting trade barriers to both members and non-
members of a regional trade arrangement. Paragraph 8 pro-
vides only that the exceptions apply "where necessary."' 6 By
not specifically requiring that measures imposed against non-
members must be imposed against members of the regional
agreement as well, this language creates the impression that
the acting state may elect to impose the measures only against
nonmember states.8 7
Yet article XXIV also states that the exceptions include
"those permitted" under the articles listed as exceptions.88 The
language those permitted appears to require following the rules
of each article to qualify for an exception. For example, a con-
tracting party may impose quantitative restrictions under arti-
cle XI, that is, outside of an article XXIV regional arrangement
only in specifically defined situations, such as temporarily to
86. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 8.
87. The permitted language of the paragraph 8 parenthetical appears, at
first glance, to support this view. It states: "except, where necessary, those
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX." GATT, supra note
1, art. XXIV, para. 8(a)(i), 8(b) (emphasis added).
Another possible interpretation is that nations must apply the exception
articles according to the general principle of MFN. For instance, some mem-
bers of the working party on the EEC agreements with the EFTA countries
maintain that nonapplication of safeguard measures against member states vi-
olates the MFN requirement of GATT. See supra notes 54-58 and accompany-
ing text. This interpretation fails to recognize that article XXIV, by definition,
is an exception to MFN, and that the principle of MFN therefore is not an ade-
quate justification for a requirement that parties apply the exceptions
nondiscriminatorily.
88. GATT, supra note 1, art. XXIV, para. 8(a)(i), 8(b).
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restrict exports during critical shortages of essential products.8 9
Thus, a member of a regional arrangement could impose article
XI quantitative restrictions on another member only after satis-
fying the article XI criteria. Under this reading, the where nec-
essary language simply might underscore the restraint with
which states must apply the exceptions.
The best argument therefore is that the exceptions to arti-
cle XXIV apply according to the rules that normally govern
their application outside of a regional trade arrangement.90 If
89. GATT, supra note 1, art. XI, para. 2(a).
90. One commentator has suggested, using a similar argument, the imposi-
tion of quantitative restrictions for balance of payment purposes in regional ar-
rangements. See P. LORTIE, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE LAW OF GATT
9-11 (1975). Paragraph 5 of article XXIV states that GATT provisions "shall
not prevent.., the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area," thus
creating the impression that article XXIV waives not only MFN but also all
other GATT requirements. P. LORTIE, supra, at 9. "Such a view, however,
overlooks one important fact-that is, that quantitative restrictions are out-
lawed in GATT unless required by a set of very specific economic conditions."
I&i Article XIII's requirement that parties apply quantitative restrictions ac-
cording to the MFN principle states:
No prohibition or restriction shall be applied by any contracting party
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other con-
tracting party or on the exportation of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party, unless the importation of the
like product of all third countries or the exportation of the like prod-
uct to all third countries is similary prohibited or restricted.
GATT, supra note 1, art. XIII, para 1.
Authorized exceptions to article XIII are in article XIV. Because article
XIV does not provide an exception for regional trade arragements, they are
not authorized exceptions to article XIII requirements. Thus, elimination of
quantitative restrictions against members discriminates against nonmembers
in violation of article XIII. P. LORTIE, supra, at 10.
This issue arose at the formation of the EEC. See G. PATTERSON,
DICRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 191-95 (1966). The Treaty of Rome
establishing the EEC authorizes a member country to apply quantitative re-
strictions against trade with third countries, but not against other member
countries. See id Members of the EEC interpreted this to permit a member
country "to apply quantitative restrictions against third countries, even when
such member was not itself in balance of payments difficulties, provided some
other member was." Id. at 192. Third countries, led by the United States and
Canada, objected, arguing "that if and when the time came that members of
the Common Market were so thoroughly integrated that they could be re-
garded as a single economic unit .... then they might.., properly have a com-
mon policy on quantitative restrictions against outsiders." I& at 193. In the
end, the working party reserved the issue, deciding instead that countries
could bring a case before the contracting parties if the issue arose. Id, at 194.
The issue arose again at the time of the Stockholm Convention establishing
the European Free Trade Area and the Montevideo Treaty establishing the
Latin American Free Trade Association. Id- at 194-95. In both instances, the
working parties agreed to reserve a formal conclusion on the issue. Id. at 195.
Thus, GATT permits a common policy of quantitative restrictions only when
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excluding regional arrangement members causes the measure
to violate its authorizing section then nothing in article XXIV
cures that violation. According to this reasoning, an article
XIX exception requires nondiscriminatory application of safe-
guard measures because the application of article XIX outside
of a regional trade arrangement implicitly includes an MFN re-
quirement.91 Most-favored-nation application of article XIX
means that whenever Canada or the United States imposed
safeguards against a third country, they also would have to ap-
ply safeguards against each other.92
B. THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF APPLYING AN ARTICLE
XIX EXCEPTION ACCORDING TO THE MFN PRINCIPLE
1. Analogy to GATT Article XX
The practical consequences of interpreting article XXIV to
include an article XIX exception also support the validity of re-
quiring nondiscriminatory application of safeguards by mem-
bers of regional agreements. The advantages of
nondiscriminatory application are most evident when consider-
ing the application of article XX in the context of a regional
trade arrangement.93 Article XXIV lists article XX as one of
the exceptions to the rule against trade barriers among mem-
bers of a regional arrangement. 94 Article XX exempts trade re-
strictions that are "necessary" to protect national health and
safety interests.95 A trade restriction imposed for these reasons
should apply against any regional trade partner if it applies
against any third party country. A nation that excludes an out-
sider's product on grounds of public health, safety, or morality
must apply the same standards to imports from a regional part-
ner. The offending import is either unsafe from both countries
or from neither-an unsafe product from a third country does
not become safe because it comes from a regional partner.
Thus, no imaginable situation would justify an article XX re-
striction against third countries without imposing the restric-
tions against regional arrangement members as well.
Similar logic applies to article XIX. Countries impose arti-
parties to a regional arrangement integrate as thoroughly as a single economic
unit. IH
91. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
92. See id.
93. See GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
94. See supra note 7.
95. GATT, supra note 1, art. XX.
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cle XIX safeguard measures when a "product is being imported
into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten se-
rious injury to domestic producers." 96 States must perceive
that an injury results from increased imports of the specified
product. Regardless of the country of origin, all imports of the
product threaten or cause injury to domestic producers in pro-
portion to each country's share of the market.97 Thus, if the
United States determines that cheap, imported tennis shoes in-
jure the domestic shoe industry, shoes made in Brazil and Can-
ada both pose a threat, even if one country holds a majority
share of the shoe market.98 If a member of a regional trade ar-
rangement applies safeguard measures only against countries
outside of the regional trade arrangement, countries within the
regional arrangement may continue their exports to the injured
member country at the same or even increased rates. Such dis-
crimination is unfair to nonmember countries who contribute
proportionally no more to the domestic producer's injuries than
the member countries do.
Not only are all offending imports of the product equally
responsible for injury to the domestic industry, but discrimina-
tion between import suppliers means that restrictions on non-
member imports must be greater to compensate for the lack of
restriction on imports from member countries. Even if the
member countries do not increase exports of the product to the
injured country in response to the restrictions on nonmembers,
the injured producers still suffer injury from the continuing
flow of the product into the country from the other member
producers. As a result, the barriers against nonmembers must
stand taller and last longer to achieve the same amount of pro-
tection as restrictions on all imports of the product would
achieve. 99 If imports from members increase to fill the gap in
the market left by the decrease in imports from nonmembers,
96. GATT, supra note 1, art. XIX, para. 1(a)
97. Because total imports cause the problem, imports from each country
share responsibility for the problem in proportion to their share of total im-
ports. The MFN principle requires each importing country to bear a propor-
tionate share of the burden created by the safeguard. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
98. This illustration does not attempt to account for special considerations
raised by imports from developing countries. Although such considerations
may be appropriate under the GATT, they are beyond the scope of this
discussion.
99. The Canada-United States FTA safeguard provision permits one party
to include the other party in the global restriction if there is a subsequent
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however, participating nations might need to impose even
greater restrictions on outsiders. Thus, when countries apply
protective measures only against nonmembers, a regional ar-
rangement begins to resemble exactly the kind of preferential
treatment that the GATT sought to eliminate °0 0 Discrimina-
tory application of safeguards benefits regional partners at the
expense of nonmember competitors, who remain burdened by
trade restraints. The GATT drafters intended contracting par-
ties to use article XIX defensively in emergencies, not offen-
sively to gain unfair trade advantages.' 0 '
2. The Positive Effects of Nondiscriminatory Safeguard
Application
Imposing safeguards on member countries as well as non-
members would yield positive results. In addition to eliminat-
ing the unfair impact of such measures on outside countries,
nondiscrimination would foster the restrained use of safeguard
measures. Regional partners would stand with nonmember
countries in opposition to the safeguards of any one member.
An article XIX exception requirement would induce regional
partners to work with other countries to insure that all coun-
tries imposing safeguards applied them, consistent with GATT
intentions, only in the most pressing circumstances as a tempo-
"surge in imports ... from the other Party that undermines the effectiveness
of such action." Canada-U.S. FTA, supra note 3, art. 1102, para 2.
100. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
101. The same reasoning applies to the remaining exceptions in article
XXIV, paragraph 8. Paragraph 2(c) of article XI authorizes trade restrictions
when imports impede a domestic price-support program as, for example, when
a greater-than-proportional amount of imports force a government to buy up a
greater share of the product. Because all imports contribute to the problem,
restrictions should affect each supplier in proportion to its market share. Un-
less governments impose restrictions against regional partners as well as out-
siders, they can achieve the necessary import reduction only by reducing the
trade of outsiders. Thus, the action will require a greater reduction in outsider
exports than would be necessary if the restriction applied to regional partner
suppliers who are also responsible for the government's adverse situation. If
regional partners increase exports to fill the gap, the government must impose
even greater restrictions on outsiders to meet the import reduction objective.
This reasoning also applies to articles XII through XV, which allow emer-
gency measures for balance of payments ("BOP") reasons. The provisions al-
low trade and payment restrictions to reduce spending when domestic
spending on foreign purchases exceeds available reserves. When the govern-
ment imposes BOP restrictions only on outsiders, those restrictions must be
severe enough to achieve import reduction objectives, and even more restric-
tive if regional trading partners are free to replace imports from outsiders.
Again, there is no justification for requiring outsiders to bear more than their
proportional share of the BOP restriction burden.
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rary measure. 0 2
3. An Exception to the Nondiscriminatory Application
Requirement
The unfairness problem does not arise in one situation:
where parties design a restriction on imports to protect a re-
gion-wide industry. Because a region-wide industry operates
across national boundaries within the territory of the regional
arrangement, partners to the arrangement legitimately may act
as a single entity to block imports from a nonpartner country
that cause or threaten serious injury to a region-wide indus-
try.10 3 Thus, all members of the regional agreement could im-
pose identically high tariffs on offending imports of the product
to the entire region. This will occur in customs unions that
have implemented fully the customs unions mechanisms or in a
free trade area which has developed to the point that. it oper-
ates like a customs union, at least in the product sector for
which a member country seeks safeguards. In such a case, the
GATT should not require the regional trading partners to im-
pose the safeguard measures against each other, because the
threshold requirement of region-wide "serious injury" is fairly
high.104
In a sense, then, article XIX is a type of transitional excep-
tion. Industries within one member country to a regional trade
arrangement will require safeguard protection from the im-
ports of the country's regional partners only when partner na-
tions are forming a regional arrangement and industries
operate primarily within natural boundaries. Once the full
mechanisms of a customs union take effect or free trade agree-
ment partners integrate their economies to the point that in-
dustrial products from a particular sector flow freely
throughout the region, all imports from the product sector are
subject to a common external tariff, and there is a common au-
102. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
103. Professor Lortie, in his argument for the nondiscriminatory applica-
tion of quantitative restrictions for balance of payment purposes, agrees with
this exception when the members of the regional arrangement operate as a
"single economic unit." P. LORTIE, supra note 90, at 10-11.
104. Trading partners that are this integrated, however, must then give up
the right to apply safeguards against each other. If countries do not apply
safeguards against their regional trading partners, other GATT contracting
parties should require countries invoking article XIX to forfeit the right to im-
pose safeguard measures against their regional trading partners in the future
without submitting the matter for reconsideration to the GATT contracting
parties.
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thority with power to analyze the import-injury in all countries.
In such a circumstance, no industry is truly domestic and the
GATT need not require that regional trading partners apply
safeguard measures against each other.10 5
In sum, the language of article XXIV suggests following
the conditions of each individual article permitting an excep-
tion. Because the application of article XIX must incorporate
the MFN principle outside the regional arrangement context,
MFN also should apply when article XIX is invoked as an ex-
ception to article XXIV. Sound policy considerations also favor
nondiscriminatory application of an article XIX exception. Ar-
ticle 1102 of the Canada-United States FTA therefore violates
the GATT because it allows the United States and Canada to
apply safeguard measures against third countries without also
applying them against each other. Canada and the United
States could comply with GATT, however, if by agreement or
practice they applied safeguards against each other whenever
they invoke safeguards against third countries. Such a require-
ment should remain in effect until the economies of the two
countries become so integrated that their industries operate
across the national border, in much the same way as United
States industries operate across state borders, or as if the
United States and Canada had formed a customs union covering
the industry that requires protection. At that point, if the
threat of serious injury from outside imports endangers an in-
dustry that is operating in both Canada and the United States,
it would not make sense for the two countries to apply safe-
guards against each other. To achieve this status, Canada and
the United States would have to impose a common external
tariff on the product(s) involved, allow duty-free circulation of
the product between Canada and the United States, and create
a common authority empowered to determine import-injuries
to the two countries. The Canada-United States FTA does not
contain such mechanisms; the region-wide industry exception
to MFN requirements in article XIX safeguards therefore can-
not apply to the United States and Canada without further
105. Nevertheless, the need for transitional safeguards may continue be-
yond the time of an interim agreement that leads to the formation of a cus-
toms union or free trade area, the elimination of all trade barriers, and even
the full implementation of the regional trading agreement. Many countries
entering regional arrangements, including the United States and Canada in
their free trade agreement, have included safeguard provisions in regional
trade agreements because they foresee this possibility.
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agreement between them and corresponding changes to each
country's laws.
CONCLUSION
Article 1102 of the new Canada-United States FTA pro-
vides that each country may apply emergency safeguards
against the other in certain circumstances. The GATT legality
of this portion of the agreement is unclear. GATT article
XXIV, which governs regional trade arrangements, does not
expressly provide article XIX safeguards as an exception to the
requirement that regional arrangement members remove sub-
stantially all trade barriers among the members. On the other
hand, even if article XIX safeguards are a legitimate exception
to article XXIV requirements, the Canada-United States FTA
raises another potential problem of GATT legality by giving
each country the option of not applying safeguards against each
other when they apply safeguards against third countries. This
power to discriminate arguably violates the requirements of ar-
ticle XIX, which scholars agree has an implicit MFN
requirement.
Because the article XXIV exceptions to regional arrange-
ment requirements apparently are not exhaustive, and because
policy considerations reveal advantages to incorporating an arti-
cle XIX exception into article XXIV, the GATT should bow to
the need that many countries have felt for a safeguards excep-
tion in regional trade arrangments and should recognize the le-
gitimacy of an article XIX trade restrictions exception. The
GATT should require, however, that countries invoking article
XIX safeguards apply them according to the requirements of
article XIX itself. Despite the unclear language of articles XIX
and XXIV on this important point, an analysis of the unfair re-
sults that would follow from the discriminatory application of
safeguards supports the conclusion that safeguards imposed by
members of a regional agreement must apply according to the
MFN principle, as they must outside the context of regional ar-
rangements. Thus, although the Canada-United States FTA
provision that allows the imposition of safeguard measures
against Canada does not require the nondiscriminatory applica-
tion of safeguards to each other as well as to outsiders, the two
countries should comply with GATT by applying the safeguards
against each other whenever they impose them against other
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countries, until the economies of the two countries become
fully integrated.
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